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THE IMPACT OF E-SERVICE ON E-MAIL USERS EVERYWHERE
I. INTRODUCTION
 For the weary plaintiff burdened with the difficult task of serving an elusive 
defendant, Internet platforms1 provide an ideal solution: compose a brief message, 
attach a PDF document, and press send. Although the practice is still in its infancy, 
a growing body of case law supports using e-mail and social media to effect service 
of process.2 This manner of service is sometimes referred to as “e-service,”3 and legal 
commentators have been forecasting its emergence for nearly two decades.4
 Unfortunately, e-service may have unintended consequences on e-mail users. 
Spam e-mail attacks pose a significant threat to users’ sensitive information, and 
messages that carry a legal obligation to open an e-mail attachment serve as an ideal 
template for such attacks.5 Without safeguards, such as an independent way to 
determine authenticity, individuals who receive such messages will be unable to tell 
if an attachment is fraudulent until it is too late.6 Many individuals will be at risk of 
1. Here, the phrase “Internet platforms” refers to e-mail and social media. However, this note focuses 
primarily on the former, since e-mail poses a greater risk of spam attacks. Although social media is not 
immune to spam attacks, such attacks are more easily contained on social media because users can often 
view a sender’s profile before opening a message and can set their privacy settings to allow messages 
only from individuals they have already added as “friends.” See, e.g., Managing Messages: Which Messages 
Will I Receive on Facebook?, Facebook Help Ctr., https://www.facebook.com/help/336759363070078 
(last visited Apr. 6, 2017) (indicating that messages from individuals who are friends with the user on 
Facebook will be sent directly to the user’s inbox, whereas messages from other individuals will be 
displayed as “message requests”). But see Phishing: What Can I Do About Phishing?, Facebook Help 
Ctr., https://www.facebook.com/help/217910864998172 (last visited Apr. 6, 2017) (indicating that 
accounts can be “hacked” if users provide their login credentials to a fake Facebook login page).
2. See infra text accompanying notes 34–51.
3. As used herein, the phrase “e-service” is limited to the method of serving process—serving originating 
documents such as summons and complaint—via e-mail or social media message without the recipient’s 
consent. See Snyder v. Alternate Energy Inc., 857 N.Y.S.2d 442, 443 (Civ. Ct. 2008); Jeremy A. Colby, 
You’ve Got Mail: The Modern Trend Towards Universal Electronic Service of Process, 51 Buff. L. Rev. 337 
(2003) (using the phrase “electronic service” throughout); Kevin W. Lewis, Comment, E-Service: 
Ensuring the Integrity of International E-Mail Service of Process, 13 Roger Williams U. L. Rev. 285 
(2008) (using the phrase “e-service” in the title, but “e-mail service” throughout); Andriana L. Shultz, 
Comment, Superpoked and Served: Service of Process Via Social Networking Sites, 43 U. Rich. L. Rev. 
1497, 1512 (2009) (using the phrase “e-service of process”). However, this phrase is also generally used 
to refer to the consensual exchange of documents and notices, including pleadings, between parties of a 
lawsuit. See, e.g., Colo. R. Civ. P. 121, § 1-26(1)(d).
4. See Colby, supra note 3, at 337, 381–82 (noting a trend toward e-service and predicting that it will 
eventually become standard practice, as opposed to an exception); Yvonne A. Tamayo, Are You Being 
Served?: E-mail and (Due) Service of Process, 51 S.C. L. Rev. 227, 246–54 (2000) (discussing the use of 
electronic technology by the courts and advocating for courts to allow e-service); Frank Conley, Comment, 
:-) Service with a Smiley: The Effect of E-mail and Other Electronic Communications on Service of Process, 11 
Temp. Int’l & Comp. L.J. 407, 412, 414, 427–28 (1997) (noting that nothing in the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure bars e-service, that e-mail has been widely accepted in society, and advocating for e-service).
5. See infra text accompanying notes 54–61. 
6. Although some e-mail platforms allow a user to preview an attachment before opening it, all a spammer 
would have to do to successfully mislead a user is create a document that appears legitimate at first 
glance. Also, although many e-mail platforms automatically scan attachments for malware, they do not 
always identify malware ahead of time. See infra text accompanying notes 62–66.
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identity theft as they must choose between opening a (perhaps dangerous) attachment 
and ignoring a message, which may be perfectly legitimate, altogether.7 If they do 
the former, they can be exposed to malware and spyware, but if they do the latter, 
they can face unknown legal consequences.8 Further, as e-service becomes more 
common, fraudulent e-service messages will appear more legitimate and will have a 
higher chance of deceiving recipients.9
 This note consists of five Parts, and ultimately proposes three solutions to the 
problems that e-service presents. Following this Introduction, Part II surveys the 
jurisprudence of e-service, including the constitutional limitations on alternate 
service of process. Part III discusses technology, focusing on the current state of 
malware (software that can have a harmful impact on a user’s computer) and spyware 
(software that monitors user activity and can secretly transmit personal information). 
Part IV examines the legal implications of failing to respond to personal service 
under New York and federal law, and submits that all e-mail and social media users 
currently have, at least as a practical matter, a duty to open any message that appears 
to contain pleadings, even if they have no reason to suspect they are being sued.
 Part V proposes three possible solutions to the problems that e-service creates, and 
acknowledges the inherent limitations of each. First, jurisdictional rules should 
mandate that an index number, or other document identifier,10 be included in the 
body of an e-service message. This would enable all recipients to safeguard their hard 
drives by ensuring the message is legitimate before opening its attachments.11 Second, 
a policy should be imposed whereby defendants are freely allowed to vacate default 
judgments obtained through e-service and defend on the merits if they can establish 
that they either did not check their messages or that they saw the message, but had no 
reason to believe it was legitimate.12 This would help prevent the emergence of a legal 
obligation to routinely check one’s e-mail and social media accounts, and encourage 
plaintiffs to compose e-service messages so that they appear as authentic as possible to 
the recipient.13 Third, either courts or the legislature should establish a uniform list of 
elements that must be present for e-service to be utilized.14 By creating a clear and 
7. This dilemma is discussed infra Part IV.
8. See infra text accompanying notes 71–94.
9. See infra Part III.
10. This note uses the phrase “document identifier” to refer to a piece of information that allows a user to 
verify that the document has been filed with the appropriate court. The importance of placing such an 
identifier in the body of an e-mail cannot be understated, since it would allow the recipient to verify the 
document without opening the attachment, which would substantially decrease the threat of 
downloading spyware. See discussion infra pp. 467–68. A document identifier could be an index or 
docket number, which recipients could use to obtain a copy of the initiatory documents through the 
court system.
11. See discussion infra pp. 467–68.
12. See discussion infra p. 469.
13. See discussion infra p. 469.
14. See discussion infra pp. 469–70.
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definitive rule, individuals (and their attorneys) could precisely evaluate whether they 
have a legal obligation to open e-service attachments.
II. THE JURISPRUDENCE OF E-SERVICE
 Due process of law requires that individuals be given a fair opportunity to defend 
themselves in an adjudicatory dispute.15 Among other things, this necessitates that a 
defendant be afforded a reasonable opportunity to receive notice of an impending 
lawsuit.16 Therefore, at a minimum, an individual seeking judicial action must 
reasonably attempt to notify the opposing party.17 The Constitution does not require 
actual notice; all that is required is an attempt that is reasonably calculated to give 
actual notice and not substantially less effective than available traditional methods.18 
Such an attempt is a formality known as “service of process,” or “service.”19 Once 
15. See Henderson v. United States, 517 U.S. 654, 672 (1996) (“[T]he core function of service is to supply 
notice of the pendency of a legal action, in a manner and at a time that affords the defendant a fair 
opportunity to answer the complaint and present defenses and objections.”); Grannis v. Ordean, 234 
U.S. 385, 394 (1914) (“The fundamental requisite of due process of law is the opportunity to be heard.”).
16. See Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Tr. Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950) (“Th[e] right to be heard has 
little reality or worth unless one is informed that the matter is pending and can choose for himself 
whether to appear or default, acquiesce or contest.”); Shultz, supra note 3, at 1499 (stating that notice 
has been a prerequisite to legal action for over 4,000 years (citing Reuven Yaron, The Laws of 
Eshnunna, 118–19 (2d rev. ed. 1988))).
17. Mullane, 339 U.S. at 314–15 (“An elementary and fundamental requirement of due process in any 
proceeding which is to be accorded finality is notice reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, 
to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present 
their objections. The notice must be of such nature as reasonably to convey the required information, 
and it must afford a reasonable time for those interested to make their appearance.  .  . . The means 
employed must be such as one desirous of actually informing the absentee might reasonably adopt to 
accomplish it.” (citations omitted)).
18. Id. at 315 (“The reasonableness and hence the constitutional validity of any chosen method may be 
defended on the ground that it is in itself reasonably certain to inform those affected, or, where 
conditions do not reasonably permit such notice, that the form chosen is not substantially less likely to 
bring home notice than other of the feasible and customary substitutes.” (citations omitted)); id. at 
317–20 (contrasting the propriety of notice by publication for defendants whose addresses are unknown 
with the impropriety of such service for defendants whose addresses are known, in light of the ability of 
ordinary mail to reach those of the latter type); see also Dusenbery v. United States, 534 U.S. 161, 170–
73 (2002) (applying Mullane and rejecting the assertion that due process required, as a “feasible 
substitute,” id. at 171, to ordinary prison-mail delivery, the FBI to send notice of forfeiture to a prisoner 
in such a manner that the prison staff would ensure the prisoner opened it, since doing so would not 
“substantially improve[],” id. at 172, the likelihood of actual notice over the delivery system used at the 
time of service).
19. See 1 Robert C. Casad et al., Jurisdiction in Civil Actions § 1.01, at 8–9 (4th ed. 2014); see also 
Process, Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014) (defining “process” as “[a] summons or writ, 
esp[ecially] to appear or respond in court”); id. (“Process is so denominated because it proceeds or issues 
forth in order to bring the defendant into court, to answer the charge preferred against him, and 
signifies the writs or judicial means by which he is brought to answer.” (citation omitted)).
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service is complete, a court may exercise its adjudicatory authority over the dispute, 
provided jurisdiction is established.20
 The extent of action required to complete service correlates with the nature of the 
suit and the amount in controversy.21 Ideally, a defendant will be handed notice in 
person, which is often referred to as “personal service,” but when this is not possible, a 
plaintiff must resort to “alternate service.”22 At a minimum, when a defendant’s address 
is known, a plaintiff must attempt to give notice through U.S. mail.23 However, when 
a defendant’s address and whereabouts are unknown or inaccessible, plaintiffs may 
resort to other forms of alternate service.24 These include service by affixture,25
20. Casad et al., supra note 19, § 1.01, at 2. In addition to the notice requirements, to adjudicate a dispute, 
a court must have the jurisdiction to do so. Id. There are two general components to jurisdiction: subject 
matter jurisdiction, which pertains to a court’s ability to decide the legal issue before it, and personal or 
territorial jurisdiction, which pertains to the court’s ability to bind the parties. See generally id. § 1.01[1]–
[2]. There are three types of personal jurisdiction: in personem jurisdiction, or jurisdiction over a named 
defendant that provides the authority to adjudicate that defendant’s personal obligations arising from 
the alleged conduct, id. § 1.01[2]; in rem jurisdiction, or jurisdiction over property within a state’s 
territory that provides the authority to adjudicate title disputes over that property, id. § 1.01[3]; and 
quasi in rem jurisdiction, which confers the authority to adjudicate title of a defendant’s property lying 
within a state’s territory as partial compensation for the alleged conduct. Id.
  At one point, in personem jurisdiction could only be obtained if a defendant was personally served 
within the forum state. See Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 720, 733 (1877). However, the Court 
repudiated this doctrine in International Shoe Co. v. Washington, when it allowed for “long-arm” 
jurisdiction by which defendants can be held liable within a forum state, to the extent that their actions 
affect individuals within that state in a legally cognizable manner, if they have sufficient “minimum 
contacts” within that state. 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).
21. See Walker v. City of Hutchinson, 352 U.S. 112, 115 (1956).
22. See id. at 116; Mullane, 339 U.S. at 315, 317; Casad et al., supra note 19, § 1.01[2][b]; Personal Service, 
Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014) (defining “personal service” as “[a]ctual delivery of the notice 
or process to the person to whom it is directed” and stating that it is “[a]lso termed actual service”); 
Service, Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014) (defining “constructive service” as “[s]ervice 
accomplished by a method or circumstance that does not give actual notice”). The phrase “constructive 
service” is sometimes used interchangeably with the phrase “substituted service,” however the latter is 
also used to refer to delivery upon an individual other than the named defendant, such as an individual 
of suitable age at the defendant’s residence. Casad et al., supra note 19, § 1.01[2][b]; see also David D. 
Siegel, New York Practice § 71, at 119 (5th ed. 2011) (noting the phrase “substituted service” can 
“confuse[] matters” because it “is sometimes used to refer to any method of summons service other than 
personal delivery”). To avoid confusion, this note uses the phrase “alternate service” to refer to all 
methods of service other than those involving personal delivery to an individual.
23. See Mennonite Bd. of Missions v. Adams, 462 U.S. 791, 800 (1983); Walker, 352 U.S. at 116 ; Mullane, 
339 U.S. at 318–19.
24. See, e.g., Mullane, 339 U.S. at 315, 317.
25. See, e.g., N.Y. C.P.L.R. 308(4) (McKinney 2017) (allowing alternate service “by affixing the summons 
to the door of either the [defendant’s] actual place of business, dwelling place or usual place of abode . . . 
and by . . . mailing the summons to [the defendant] at his or her last known residence . . . within twenty 
days”).
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publication,26 telex,27 facsimile,28 and recently, e-mail29 and social media.30
26. See Mullane, 339 U.S. at 316–17. In fact, at least one court has allowed online publication. Compare 
Microsoft Corp. v. Does, No. 12-CV-1335 (SJ)(RLM), 2012 WL 5497946, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 13, 
2012) (permitting service by e-mail and Internet publication where the defendants’ whereabouts and 
identities were unknown, in an action for injunctive relief and damages for the alleged use of malware), 
with MLO v. “Younglawyer,” No. 506175/2014, 2015 WL 1597530, at *2 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Apr. 2, 2015) 
(rejecting service by online publication on a message board in response to anonymous defendants’ 
allegedly tortious comments, even though service through e-mail was unavailable, because there was no 
indication that the defendants would become aware of such posts and also because no monetary relief 
could be accorded with the defendants’ identities unknown, and injunctive relief to prevent further 
harm unlikely). See generally Lauren A. Rieders, Note, Old Principles, New Technology, and the Future of 
Notice in Newspapers, 38 Hofstra L. Rev. 1009 (2010) (arguing that courts should permit notice by 
publication in online newspapers).
27. See New Eng. Merchs. Nat’l Bank v. Iran Power Generation & Transmission Co., 495 F. Supp. 73, 81 
(S.D.N.Y. 1980); Shultz, supra note 3, at 1504–05. The court in New England Merchants Nat’ l Bank stated: 
Courts . . . cannot be blind to changes and advances in technology. No longer do we live 
in a world where communications are conducted solely by mail carried by fast sailing 
clipper or steam ships. Electronic communication via satellite can and does provide 
instantaneous transmission of notice and information. No longer must process be 
mailed to a defendant’s door when he can receive complete notice at an electronic 
terminal inside his very office, even when the door is steel and bolted shut. 
 495 F. Supp. at 81. Merriam-Webster defines “telex” as “a system of communication in which messages 
are sent over long distances by using a telephone system and are printed by using a special machine 
(called a teletypewriter).” Telex, Merriam-Webster, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/
telex (last visited Apr. 6, 2017).
28. See Broadfoot v. Diaz (In re Int’l Telemedia Assocs., Inc.), 245 B.R. 713, 722 (N.D. Ga. Bankr. 2000) 
(allowing service by e-mail); Aaron R. Chacker, Note, E-ffectuating Notice: Rio Properties v. Rio 
International Interlink, 48 Vill. L. Rev. 597, 607–10 (2003).
29. Fisher v. Petr Konchalovsky Found., No. 15-cv-9831(AJN), 2016 WL 1047394 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 10, 
2016) (allowing service by e-mail to a Russian defendant upon a showing that e-mail was likely to reach 
the defendant since he had responded to an e-mail concerning the subject matter of the dispute within 
the past two months at the e-mail address, and also that service by other means would not suffice since 
Russia had suspended judicial cooperation with the United States and objected to service by international 
mail); Dama S.P.A. v. Does, No. 15-cv-4528 (VM), 2015 WL 10846737 (S.D.N.Y. June 12, 2015) 
(permitting service by e-mail upon a defendant allegedly selling counterfeited goods through websites 
based in China); AMTO, LLC v. Bedford Asset Mgmt., LLC, No. 14-CV-9913, 2015 WL 3457452, 
at *7–10 (S.D.N.Y. May 29, 2015) (similar); Sulzer Mixpac AG v. Medenstar Indus. Co., 312 F.R.D. 
329 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) (finding that service by e-mail at a “contact” address listed on the defendant’s 
website was reasonably calculated to provide actual notice and thus comported with due process and 
international treaty); Phoenix-Dolezal v. Ni, No. 11 Civ. 3722(LAK)(JLC), 2012 WL 121105, at *5 
(S.D.N.Y. Jan. 17, 2012) (finding that service through e-mail and certified mail was proper); D.R.I., 
Inc. v. Dennis, No. 03 Civ. 10026(PKL), 2004 WL 1237511 (S.D.N.Y. June 3, 2004) (allowing service 
by e-mail in addition to publication and certified mail sent to the defendant’s last known address); see In 
re J.T., 37 N.Y.S.3d 846 (Fam. Ct. Sept. 2, 2016) (allowing service by e-mail in an action to terminate 
the recipient-father’s parental rights where he had been deported to Jordan and had previously 
communicated with the social worker via e-mail but failed to provide a physical address).
30. See Ferrarese v. Shaw, 164 F. Supp. 3d 361, 368 (E.D.N.Y. 2016) (permitting service via Facebook, 
e-mail, and certified mail to the defendant’s last known address in an action for, inter alia, parental 
custody); FTC v. PCCare247 Inc., No. 12 Civ. 7189(PAE), 2013 WL 841037, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 7, 
2013) (permitting service by e-mail and Facebook upon international defendants allegedly engaged in 
an Internet scheme to defraud American citizens); Baidoo v. Blood-Dzraku, 5 N.Y.S.3d 709 (Sup. Ct. 
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 Beyond the minimum required by due process, each jurisdiction within the 
United States imposes its own statutory requirements that govern service of process.31 
With respect to alternate service, some of these statutes contain catchall-type 
provisions that allow courts to determine an effective manner of service when they 
find that another will be futile.32 Through these catchall provisions, some courts 
have allowed e-service.33
 The first published opinion in which a court allowed e-service was In re 
International Telemedia Associates, Inc. v. Diaz, where an international defendant-
debtor had refused to provide a permanent address, but did provide a permanent 
facsimile number and e-mail address.34 The court ordered service to be effected by 
facsimile, e-mail, and regular mail to the defendant’s last known address.35
 Subsequently, the court in Rio Properties v. Rio International Interlink allowed 
service to be effected by e-mail upon an international defendant entity that could not 
be served by conventional methods because its actual address was unascertainable.36 
Noting that the defendant had structured its business so that it could only be reached 
by e-mail, the court found that service by e-mail comported with both the Constitution 
and rule 4(f)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (“Federal Rules”).37 Nevertheless, 
the court noted that e-mail service has three shortcomings: (1) there is usually no way 
to confirm receipt, (2) system compatibility issues could lead to disputes over whether 
an attachment was actually received, and (3) attaching certain documents may be 
2015) (discussing e-service generally, addressing the potential problems with service via social media, 
and permitting service to be made solely by Facebook after noting the futility of service by publication).
31. Alyssa L. Eisenberg, Comment, Keep Your Facebook Friends Close and Your Process Server Closer: The 
Expansion of Social Media Service of Process to Cases Involving Domestic Defendants, 51 San Diego L. Rev. 
779 app. a (2014). Statutory approval of the particular method of alternate service is a prerequisite to 
obtaining in personam jurisdiction over a defendant thereby. See 62B Am. Jur. 2d Process § 134 (2017).
32. Typical of these provisions is rule 308(5) of the CPLR, which states that “service upon a natural person” 
may be made “in such manner as the court, upon motion without notice, directs, if service is impracticable 
under paragraphs one, two and four of this section.” N.Y. C.P.L.R. 308(5) (McKinney 2017).
33. See supra notes 30–31; infra notes 48–51; cf., e.g., Am. Heritage Int’l, Inc. v. Sarabi, No. 2:15-cv-00101-
GMN-CWH, 2015 WL 6501129, at *2 (Nev. Dist. Ct. Oct. 27, 2015) (finding that rule 4 of the 
Nevada Rules of Civil Procedure, which contains no catchall provision, does not allow service by 
electronic means).
34. 245 B.R. 713, 715–18 (N.D. Ga. Bankr. 2000); see Colby, supra note 3, at 356–60.
35. Int’ l Telemedia Assocs., Inc., 245 B.R. at 718–19. As statutory authority, the International Telemedia 
Associates court relied on rule 4(f)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, id. at 719–21, which 
provides that service may be made on a foreign individual “by other means not prohibited by international 
agreement[, as the court orders].” Id. at 719 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(f)(3)).
36. 284 F.3d 1007, 1013, 1016 (9th Cir. 2002). In Rio Properties, the plaintiff was unable to serve the 
defendant at the address listed on its trademark application because that address housed only its 
international courier, which was not authorized to accept service, and the plaintiff could not determine 
the defendant’s Costa Rican address after searching international directory databases, but was able to 
uncover the defendant’s e-mail address. Id. at 1012–13. The plaintiff attempted service through the 
defendant’s international courier and Los Angeles attorney. Id. at 1013. See Chacker, supra note 28, for 
a detailed discussion of Rio Properties.
37. Rio Props., 284 F.3d at 1017–18.
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impossible because of imprecise imaging technology.38 Despite these shortcomings, the 
court affirmed the use of e-mail to effect service and acknowledged that district courts 
will need to balance benefits and drawbacks of e-mail use on a case-by-case basis.39
 In New York, the court in Hollow v. Hollow became the first court to authorize 
e-service under rule 308(5) of the New York Civil Practice Law and Rules (CPLR).40 
There, a defendant in a divorce action had been living in a secure complex in Saudi 
Arabia for over two years, and he had only been communicating with the plaintiff 
through e-mail.41 The defendant’s employer, who controlled the complex, refused to 
accept service on his behalf, and an international process server could have faced criminal 
charges for attempting to leave notice with the security personnel.42 After concluding 
that other methods of service would be impracticable, the court allowed e-service, in 
combination with service through international registered and standard mail.43
 The court in Snyder v. Alternate Energy Inc. followed suit, allowing e-service after 
the plaintiff demonstrated that obtaining the defendant’s physical addresses was 
impracticable and that he previously communicated with the defendant by e-mail.44 
Once the plaintiff saw that the defendant was online regularly45 and received 
notification that the defendant read the e-mails requesting his current address,46 the 
court ordered the plaintiff to (1) send notice by e-mail on two consecutive dates bearing 
the subject line, “LEGAL PAPERS OPEN ATTACHMENT IMMEDIATELY”; 
(2) mail notice to the defendant’s last known addresses; and (3) call the defendant’s 
mobile number to advise him of the attempts being made.47
 From these cases, a pattern emerges: E-service is generally permitted if (1) the 
court has the statutory authority to allow it;48 (2) the plaintiff shows that personal 
38. Id. at 1018. The court also noted that there could be issues about whether electronic signatures would 
comport with rules 4(a) and 11 of the Federal Rules. Id.
39. Id. at 1018–19, 1023. Following Rio Properties, courts have both allowed and declined e-mail service on 
an ad hoc basis. See Eisenberg, supra note 31, at 789 n.64.
40. 747 N.Y.S.2d 704 (Sup. Ct. 2002); Colby, supra note 3, at 366–67.
41. Hollow, 747 N.Y.S.2d at 705.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 706–08.
44. 857 N.Y.S.2d 442, 443–44 (Civ. Ct. 2008). There, the plaintiff had found the defendant’s address 
vacant, and was unable to obtain a current address after employing the marshal, subpoenaing the 
defendant’s cellular provider, checking with the local post office, and searching court records. Id. at 445; 
see also D.R.I., Inc. v. Dennis, No. 03 Civ. 10026(PKL), 2004 WL 1237511 (S.D.N.Y. June 3, 2004) 
(allowing service by e-mail, in addition to mailing notice to the defendant’s last-known addresses with 
return receipt requested and publishing notice in newspapers local to those addresses for four weeks, 
after plaintiff ’s attempts to effect service at the last-known addresses were unsuccessful).
45. The defendant’s screen name appeared on the plaintiff ’s AOL Messenger “buddy list” whenever the two 
were simultaneously online. Snyder, 857 N.Y.S.2d at 444–45.
46. The plaintiff requested a “return receipt” for the e-mails sent to the defendant. Id. at 445. 
47. Id. at 449.
48. See 62B Am. Jur. 2d, supra note 31, § 134.
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service by other methods would be impracticable;49 (3) the plaintiff shows that the 
e-mail address is reasonably reliable;50 and (4) e-service is used in conjunction with
49. Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(f)(3); N.Y. C.P.L.R. 308(5), 311(b) (McKinney 2017); see also Ferrarese v. Shaw, 164 
F. Supp. 3d 361 (E.D.N.Y. 2016) (finding that the plaintiff established the requisite impracticability to 
justify e-service where the defendant had changed her name multiple times, personal delivery attempts 
at her last known address failed, and multiple skip trace searches yielded no current address); AMTO, 
LLC v. Bedford Asset Mgmt., LLC, No. 14-CV-9913, 2015 WL 3457452 (S.D.N.Y. May 29, 2015) 
(permitting service by e-mail upon a Russian defendant where the suspension of judicial cooperation 
with the United States made other methods of service unavailable); Transclick, Inc. v. Rantnetwork, 
Inc., No. 11 Civ. 8171(LTS), 2013 WL 4015768, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 7, 2013) (vacating an order 
permitting service by e-mail where the defendant demonstrated that his address was readily attainable 
by a basic Internet search and where e-mail messages sent bore no indication that they pertained to legal 
matters); D.R.I., Inc., 2004 WL 1237511 (finding impracticability established where personal service 
attempts at addresses found by, inter alia, searching DMV records failed); Hollow v. Hollow, 747 
N.Y.S.2d 704, 706 (Sup. Ct. 2002) (stating that “[a]lthough a showing of impracticability does not 
require proof of due diligence or actual attempts to serve a party under each and every method prescribed 
in CPLR 308, the movant will be required to make a competent showing as to the actual prior efforts 
that were made to effect service” (citations omitted)); Snyder, 857 N.Y.S.2d at 446 (citing Franklin v. 
Winard, 592 N.Y.S.2d 726 (App. Div. 1993), for the proposition that a plaintiff can make a showing of 
impracticability through “diligent, albeit unsuccessful, efforts to obtain information regarding a 
defendant’s current residence, business address or place of abode”).
50. Fisher v. Petr Konchalovsky Found., No. 15-cv-9831(AJN), 2016 WL 1047394 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 10, 2016) 
(allowing service by e-mail to a Russian defendant upon a showing that e-mail was likely to reach the 
defendant since within the past two months he had responded to an e-mail concerning the subject matter 
of the dispute that was sent to the same e-mail address, and discussing cases where service by e-mail was 
denied because the plaintiff failed to demonstrate that the e-mail address given was accurate or used by the 
defendant); Philip Morris USA Inc. v. Veles Ltd., No. 06 CV 2988(GBD), 2007 WL 725412, at *3 
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 12, 2007) (permitting service by e-mail upon corporations that routinely communicated 
with customers via that e-mail address); Safadjou v. Mohammadi, 964 N.Y.S.2d 801, 803–04 (App. Div. 
2013) (affirming a judgment awarding divorce and parental custody where service by e-mail was effected 
upon the defendant at the e-mail addresses through which the defendant had previously communicated 
with the plaintiff); In re J.T., 37 N.Y.S.3d 846, 849–50 (Fam. Ct. 2016) (allowing service by e-mail where 
the defendant had been deported to Jordan and had previously communicated via e-mail but failed to 
provide a physical address); see Nykcool A.B. v. Pac. Int’l Servs., Inc., 66 F. Supp. 3d 385, 391 (S.D.N.Y. 
2014) (finding that service by e-mail to an e-mail address that was listed as a “Contact Us” e-mail address 
on a website hyperlinked to the defendant’s personal website was not reasonably calculated to provide 
actual notice, and directing service to be made upon the defendant’s attorney by e-mail); SEC v. China Ne. 
Petrol. Holdings Ltd., 27 F. Supp. 3d 379, 399 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (denying service by, inter alia, e-mail sent 
to the defendant’s son where there was no indication that such an e-mail would reach the defendant); 
Silverman v. Blackman, No. CV 13-1349 (JS)(ARL), 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 155779, at *5–6 (E.D.N.Y. 
Oct. 30, 2013) (denying service by e-mail in an action for, inter alia, trespass damages upon a finding that 
the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate that the defendant sought to be served was actually the named 
defendant); Fortunato v. Chase Bank USA, N.A., No. 11 Civ. 6608(JFK), 2012 WL 2086950, at *2 
(S.D.N.Y. June 7, 2012) (denying service by Facebook message and e-mail address listed on a Facebook 
account where the plaintiff provided no evidence that the defendant accesses the Facebook account or even 
that the account was indeed the defendant’s actual account); Ehrenfeld v. Salim a Bin Mahfouz, No. 04 
Civ. 9641(RCC), 2005 WL 696769, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 23, 2005) (denying service by e-mail where there 
was no showing that the defendant used the proffered e-mail address to exchange important business 
information or for any purpose other than receiving miscellaneous requests for information); In re 
Citigroup Glob. Mkts. Inc. v. Cid, No. 654211/12, 2013 WL 3724941 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. July 16, 2013) 
(denying service via e-mail to e-mail addresses provided on bank account applications that the defendants 
filled out in 2006 and 2009 because the plaintiffs failed to provide any information showing that the 
e-mail addresses were still valid or active). But see SEC v. Lines, No. 07 Civ. 11387(DLC), 2009 WL 
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other methods of alternate service, such as U.S. mail and publication, if available.51
III. THE TECHNOLOGY BEHIND E-SERVICE
 E-mail and social media have become ubiquitous aspects of virtually every 
American’s daily routine.52 However, because of the relatively low cost associated 
with sending messages over the Internet, as well as the ability to send attachments 
that run programs on a user’s computer when opened, these platforms are ideal 
mediums through which criminals can engage in fraud, such as identity theft.53
 “Spam” is the term given to unsolicited e-mails, which are often sent to thousands 
of recipients at a time.54 It can pose threats to recipients in three forms: (1) solicitations 
for fraudulent commercial products; (2) inducements to click on links to fraudulent 
websites, known as “phishing”; and (3) attachments that contain malware.55 “Malware,” 
3179503, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 2, 2009) (citing Mullane and finding that it was not necessary to demonstrate 
that the defendant was known to use the e-mail address when his whereabouts were unknown).
51. See Ferrarese, 164 F. Supp. 3d at 386 (permitting service via Facebook, e-mail, and certified mail to the 
defendant’s last known address in an action for, inter alia, parental custody); FTC v. PCCare247 Inc., 
No. 12 Civ. 7189(PAE), 2013 WL 841037, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 7, 2013) (permitting service by e-mail 
and Facebook); Microsoft Corp. v. Does, No. 12-CV-1335 (SJ)(RLM), 2012 WL 5497946, at *3 
(E.D.N.Y. Nov. 13, 2012) (permitting service upon defendants by e-mail and Internet publication); 
Phoenix-Dolezal v. Ni, No. 11 Civ. 3722(LAK)(JLC), 2012 WL 121105, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 17, 2012) 
(finding that service through e-mail and certified mail was proper); Gurung v. Malhotra, 279 F.R.D. 
215, 219–21 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (granting default judgment where service had been effected through 
newspaper publication, certified mail, and e-mail to the defendant’s publicly available government 
e-mail address despite the Indian government’s intervention in an attempt to challenge the sufficiency 
of such service); D.R.I., Inc., 2004 WL 1237511, at *2 (allowing service by e-mail in addition to 
publication and certified mail sent to the defendant’s last known address). But see Baidoo v. Blood-
Dzraku, 5 N.Y.S.3d 709, 715–16 (Sup. Ct. 2015) (allowing service by Facebook as the only method of 
service after noting the futility of service by publication).
52. See Andrew Perrin, Social Media Usage: 2005-2015, Pew Res. Ctr. (Oct. 8, 2015), http://www.
pewinternet.org/2015/10/08/social-networking-usage-2005-2015 (indicating that, as of 2015, seventy-
six per cent of adult Internet users use social media); Aaron Smith, U.S. Smartphone Use in 2015, Pew 
Res. Ctr. (Apr. 1, 2015), http://www.pewinternet.org/2015/04/01/us-smartphone-use-in-2015 
(indicating that eighty-eight per cent of smartphone owners surveyed used e-mail at least once a week).
53. Harry Henderson, Encyclopedia of Computer Science and Technology 238 (rev. ed. 2009); id. 
at 451 (“The fundamental driving force of spam is the fact that, given one has Internet access, sending 
e-mail costs essentially nothing, no matter how many messages are sent. Thus even if only a tiny number 
of people respond . . . the result is almost pure profit for the spammer.”).
54. See id. at 450–51 (noting that the term “spam” was likely coined in reference to a popular Monty Python 
sketch in which a group of Vikings use the word “spam” in an absurdly repetitious manner); Spam: What 
Is Spam?, Spam Laws, http://www.spamlaws.com/what-is-spam.html (last visited Apr. 6, 2017). 
Estimates suggest that spam e-mails comprise anywhere from 45%–73% of all e-mails sent, while only 
2.5% of spam e-mails consist of scams and fraud, with 73% of those being attempts at identity theft. Spam 
Statistics and Facts, Spam Laws, http://www.spamlaws.com/spam-stats.html (last visited Apr. 6, 2017).
55. Henderson, supra note 53, at 451. This note is concerned with the lattermost threat, although the 
fraudulent e-service messages may also take the form of phishing attacks, for example where the 
recipient is directed to a fraudulent court website that will ask for personal information. See infra text 
accompanying notes 69–70.
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short for “malicious software,” includes computer viruses and worms.56 Often these 
arrive in the form of a “Trojan Horse” (“Trojan”), a seemingly legitimate file that, when 
opened, installs malware on a user’s computer.57 Spammers will compose messages that 
trick recipients into opening the Trojan either by threatening or inciting them, usually 
suggesting that the recipient must act immediately to secure a financial gain or to 
prevent imminent harm.58
 Once installed, the malware can perform a variety of functions. For example, a 
form of malware known as “spyware” can covertly scan a computer’s hard drive in 
search of personal information and send the information back to the source after 
creating a “backdoor.”59 Some spyware can also record keystrokes in an attempt to 
retrieve a user’s passwords and other information.60 Further, malware can secretly 
hijack a user’s computer to access other computers on the same network, or use that 
computer as a platform from which further spam attacks can be carried out.61
 To counteract these threats, there are three common methods of scanning e-mails 
and their attachments for malware: (1) heuristics-based detection, which looks for 
words and phrases typically used in spam and phishing attacks; (2) signature-based 
detection and blacklisting, which searches for known malware code or untrustworthy 
IP addresses; and (3) behavioral detection, which observes how a program will 
operate before it is opened.62
56. Erin F. MacLean & Deborah M. Micu, Internal Office Practices Can Make or Break a Law Firm’s 
Cybersecurity, Mont. Law., Dec./Jan. 2015, at 16, 25. A “virus” is a program that automatically 
reproduces itself throughout a user’s hard drive, whereas a “worm” will exploit existing f laws in a 
computer’s network without reproducing itself. Henderson, supra note 53, at 110–11; see also Types of 
Malware, Spam Laws, http://www.spamlaws.com/malware-types.html (last visited Apr. 6, 2017).
57. See Types of Malware, supra note 56.
58. How Do I Know if It Is Spam?, Spam Laws, http://www.spamlaws.com/learn-how-to-identify-spam.
html (last visited Apr. 6, 2017). For discussions about phishing and other forms of identity theft in the 
digital age, see Jennifer Lynch, Note, Identity Theft in Cyberspace: Crime Control Methods and Their 
Effectiveness in Combating Phishing Attacks, 20 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 259 (2005), and J. Anthony Vittal, 
Phishing, Pharming, and Other Scams, GPSolo, Dec. 2005, at 26.
59. See Spyware and Trojan Horses, Spam Laws, http://www.spamlaws.com/trojan-horse.html (last visited 
Apr. 6, 2017). This could be especially disastrous for law firms, considering the amount of confidential 
and sensitive information that would become exposed.
60. See Avoiding Keystroke Loggers, Spam Laws, http://www.spamlaws.com/keystroke-loggers.html (last 
visited Apr. 6, 2017).
61. John Markoff, Attack of the Zombie Computers Is Growing Threat, N.Y. Times (Jan. 7, 2007), http://www.
nytimes.com/2007/01/07/technology/07net.html.
62. See Ted Green, Greenview Data, Inc., How URL Spam Filtering Beats Bayesian/Heuristics 
Hands Down 4–5 (2005), https://www.greenviewdata.com/library/white-papers/spam-url-filtering-
vs-bayesian-heuristics.pdf; Lenny Zeltser, How Antivirus Software Works: Virus Detection Techniques, 
SearchSecurity (Oct. 11, 2011), http://searchsecurity.techtarget.com/tip/How-antivirus-software-
works-Virus-detection-techniques.
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 However, none of these methods would be foolproof against fraudulent e-service 
messages.63 Heuristic-based detection would likely be ineffective because the body of 
the message will usually be indistinguishable from a legitimate e-service message.64 
Signature-based detection and blacklisting would fail to identify attacks from 
unknown sources using previously unwritten code.65 Finally, behavioral detection is 
limited in that certain behaviors, such as identifying keystrokes, would not be 
enough, on their own, to trigger filtration.66
 E-service messages thus provide an ideal template for phishing attacks. A 
legitimate e-service message could come from an unknown e-mail address and 
contain an attachment that urges the recipient to act immediately.67 A savvy spammer 
could easily send thousands of e-mails purporting to be e-service messages, address 
each one individually, and make them appear to have come from a legitimate sender.68 
If the malware goes undetected, there would be no way to differentiate between a 
legitimate e-service message and a spam attack.
 Indeed, this practice has already begun. Today, spam attacks take the form of a 
“court notice” e-mail, whereby recipients are told that they must appear in a particular 
court on a given day, and that they should either open an explanatory attachment or 
call a listed telephone number.69 In New York, for instance, this problem became so 
pervasive that the official website for the New York State Unified Court System now 
contains an advisory warning about the illegitimacy of such e-mails.70 Unfortunately, 
63. See Henderson, supra note 53, at 451 (stating that, because of the relentless battle between spammers 
and spam-fighters, perhaps the only way to prevent spam altogether is through an Internet-wide 
authentication of e-mail users).
64. Green, supra note 62, at 5–6; see id. at 6 (noting that “[h]euristic systems are unsuitable for some 
industries like medicine and law”).
65. See id. at 4; Zeltser, supra note 62.
66. See Zeltser, supra note 62.
67. See sources cited supra note 58.
68. See Henderson, supra note 53, at 370; How Spam Works, Spam Laws, http://www.spamlaws.com/how-
spam-works.html (last visited Apr. 6, 2017).
69. See Court Summons Scam Emails Carry Malware, Better Bus. Bureau (Sept. 9, 2014), http://www.bbb.
org/upstatesc/news-events/bbb-scam-alerts/2014/09/court-summons-scam-emails-carry-malware.
70. Important Notice About “Scam” Emails Involving Notices to Appear, NYCourts.gov, https://www.
nycourts.gov/contactus/scamemails.shtml (last visited Apr. 6, 2017). The notice reads: 
 It has come to our attention that scam emails, purporting to be coming from the 
New York State Court System, directing recipients to report to court and to open an 
attachment for more information, are infecting recipients’ computers with a virus.
 These scam emails typically instruct recipients to report to court on a specific day 
and time, and they often direct the recipient to bring documents and witnesses with 
them. They also typically warn that the court may proceed in their absence and that 
they will be sanctioned if they do not appear. The emails also instruct recipients to read 
a court notice that is attached. The attachment contains a computer virus. Do not open 
the attachment. Delete the email.
 Be on the alert, if you are not involved in a court proceeding and have not supplied 
the [New York] courts with an email address for receiving court notifications, the 
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this advisory warning only addresses e-mails purporting to come from the court 
itself, and not those purporting to come from parties or their attorneys, as a fraudulent 
e-service message would.
IV.  THE LEGAL RAMIFICATIONS OF FAILING TO DOWNLOAD AN E-SERVICE 
ATTACHMENT
 Consider the following scenario: A worried client pays her attorney a visit after 
receiving an e-mail with the subject line “Important: Legal Notice ***DO NOT 
IGNORE***.” The message appears to have come from “Smith Law Firm,” and it 
tells her to open an attached document labeled “Summons and Complaint.” It 
provides no court information, let alone any indication of what state or county the 
supposed action was brought in. Should she be advised to open the attachment? If 
the e-mail is legitimate, has she properly been brought under the jurisdiction of the 
court? If she ignores the e-mail, might she face a default judgment that cannot be 
vacated? Finally, after considering all risks, what would the “reasonably prudent 
person” do under these circumstances?
 A. Default Judgments in General
 If the e-mail is legitimate and the client ignores it, the primary legal threat facing 
her would be a default judgment in favor of the plaintiff. A plaintiff who claims a 
legally cognizable cause of action will be entitled to a default judgment against a 
defendant who does not appear after being served with process.71 A defendant 
seeking to vacate a default judgment must move to do so before the court that entered 
the judgment.72 Otherwise, a plaintiff may enforce the judgment for up to twenty 
years after the date of entry.73
 To assess the client’s situation, the attorney must consider whether a court would 
vacate a default judgment resulting from the purported e-service message. After all, 
if the judgment could be vacated easily, there is little reason for her to risk identity 
theft by opening the e-mail attachment, since she would be able to safely await a 
default judgment as proof of its legitimacy and defend herself thereafter. Conversely, 
courts do not communicate with you by email. The court system does not send 
unsolicited emails or requests for personal information. The court system does not send 
emails threatening sanctions if you do not appear in court. Nor does the court system 
send emails that ask you to open attachments in order to obtain additional information.
 Id. (emphasis omitted). The Better Business Bureau issued a similar advisory. Scam Alert—You’re On 
Trial? Watch Out for This Email Scam, Better Bus. Bureau (Mar. 21, 2014), http://www.bbb.org/
council/news-events/bbb-scam-alerts/2014/03/scam-alert-youre-on-trial-watch-out-for-this-email-
scam.
71. Fed. R. Civ. P. 55; N.Y. C.P.L.R. 3215 (McKinney 2017).
72. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b); C.P.L.R. 5015(a).
73. Fed. R. Civ. P. 69(a)(1) (providing that the forum state’s procedure will govern execution of a money 
judgment); C.P.L.R. 211(b).
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if a swift vacatur74 cannot be assured, then perhaps it would behoove her to open the 
attachment and hope that her computer’s security can ward off the virus.
 B. Relief Due to Lack of Jurisdiction 
 Under both the Federal Rules and the New York CPLR, a defendant may seek 
relief from a judgment at any time for lack of jurisdiction.75 Jurisdiction does not 
exist where a plaintiff did not serve the defendant as required by law or where a court 
does not have subject matter jurisdiction over the dispute.76 Further, a defendant 
seeking relief for lack of jurisdiction need not assert a meritorious defense to the 
underlying claim because, as a constitutional imperative, a judgment entered without 
jurisdiction is a nullity.77
 Unfortunately, this argument would likely not help the client if the e-service 
message were legitimate. Pending an unlikely determination that e-service does not 
comport with due process78 or that the court did not have the authority to order it,79 the 
e-service message would be sufficient to subject her to the court’s personal jurisdiction.80 
Indeed, this would be true even if she could ultimately prove that she never saw the 
e-mail, because the Constitution does not require actual notice of the action.81
 C. Relief Due to Fraud
 A defendant may also move to vacate a judgment by showing that the plaintiff 
engaged in fraud.82 Under the Federal Rules, defendants must assert these grounds 
within one year of the judgment’s entry.83 However, the CPLR allows defendants to 
74. Vacatur, Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014) (defining “vacatur” as “[t]he act of annulling or 
setting aside” or “[a] rule or order by which a proceeding is vacated”).
75. Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(4); C.P.L.R. 5015(a)(4).
76. See 1 David L. Ferstendig, Weinstein, Korn & Miller CPLR Manual § 3.01, at 3-3 (3d ed. 
2015). See generally id. § 3.02 (explaining subject matter jurisdiction). For “subject matter jurisdiction” 
defined, see supra note 20.
77. See Peralta v. Heights Med. Ctr., Inc., 485 U.S. 80 (1988); Gager v. White, 425 N.E.2d 851 (N.Y. 1981). 
In practice, it is best to move for relief in the alternative—by asserting either that no personal jurisdiction 
was obtained in the first place, or that if personal jurisdiction was obtained, the defendant has an excuse 
for the delay and a meritorious defense. See Siegel, supra note 22, § 108, at 202–03.
78. See supra notes 13–30 and accompanying text.
79. See supra text accompanying notes 30 –33. 
80. See supra notes 29–30, 52, and accompanying text. Of course, this assumes that the hypothetical plaintiff 
asserted an appropriate jurisdictional basis over the client. See supra note 20. 
81. All that is required is a step “reasonably calculated” to provide actual notice. Mullane v. Cent. Hanover 
Bank & Tr. Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950).
82. Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(3); N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5015(a)(3) (McKinney 2017).
83. Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(c)(1).
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assert these grounds at any time,84 and the defendant need not assert a meritorious 
defense to the underlying action.85 In both jurisdictions, when a plaintiff lies to the 
court when requesting permission to resort to alternate service, such as by 
mischaracterizing or fabricating the attempts taken to effect in-person service, the 
fraud provides grounds for vacatur.86
 Thus, if the plaintiff lied to the court about the steps taken to attempt service by 
other methods, and those lies are uncovered on a motion to vacate the judgment, the 
client would likely succeed under both the Federal Rules and the CPLR. However, 
there is an obvious practical difficulty: she might have to disprove the plaintiff ’s 
assertions long after the fact. Fortunately, estimating the degree of difficulty is fairly 
straightforward. If she has been residing in the same location for a long time, a court 
is less likely to believe that the plaintiff actually made the attempts alleged (and she 
should be expecting further notice to arrive in the mail).87 However, if she has 
recently moved without leaving a forwarding address,88 or is otherwise transient, 
there is a reasonable possibility that a court will believe a plaintiff ’s assertions about 
the difficulty of effecting in-person service and service by mail. Thus, the safest 
course of action for a client in this scenario might be to open the attachment.
 D. Excusable Default
 If the court were to believe the allegations supporting the plaintiff ’s original 
motion for e-service—that other methods of service were attempted but 
unsuccessful—then the client would need to assert “excusable default” as a ground 
for the vacatur.
 Owing to the potential severity of default judgments, both the Federal Rules and 
the CPLR provide a statutory period allowing defendants to seek vacatur on the 
basis of “excusable default” by asserting both a justification for the delay in appearing 
84. Rule 5015(a)(3) of the CPLR does not contain a time limit. See C.P.L.R. 5015(a)(3); Wells Fargo Bank 
N.A. v. Podeswik, 981 N.Y.S.2d 230 (App. Div. 2014).
85. See Tonawanda Sch. Emps. Fed. Credit Union v. Zack, 662 N.Y.S.2d 885 (App. Div. 1997).
86. See, e.g., Shaw v. Shaw, 467 N.Y.S.2d 231, 233–35 (App. Div. 1983) (holding that a motion to vacate 
under rule 5015(c) of the CPLR based on “extrinsic fraud”—which prevents parties from fully and fairly 
representing themselves—need not be supported by a meritorious defense, analogizing it to a motion 
based on lack of jurisdiction owing to improper service, and differentiating extrinsic fraud from “sewer 
service”—where the fraud is made upon the court to conceal that no proper service has been made—
although characterizing both as “fraud” and not “ jurisdictional” per se).
87. See Transclick, Inc. v. Rantnetwork, Inc., No. 11 Civ. 8171(LTS), 2013 WL 4015768, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. 
Aug. 7, 2013) (vacating an order permitting e-mail service, where the defendant demonstrated that his 
address was readily attainable by a basic Internet search and where e-mail messages sent bore no 
indication that they pertained to legal matters).
88. See D.R.I., Inc. v. Dennis, No. 03 Civ. 10026(PKL), 2004 WL 1237511 (S.D.N.Y. June 3, 2004) 
(finding impracticability established where personal service attempts at addresses found by, inter alia, 
searching DMV records failed); Baidoo v. Blood-Dzraku, 5 N.Y.S.3d 709, 711–12, 716 (Sup. Ct. 2015) 
(finding that the defendant’s failure to provide a forwarding address to the post office supported a 
finding of impracticability and justified resorting to service by Facebook).
464
THE IMPACT OF E-SERVICE ON E-MAIL USERS EVERYWHERE
and a meritorious defense to the underlying action.89 Courts analyze the justification 
given for the delay on an ad hoc basis, often considering the length of delay, the 
reason for the default, and the prejudice that would result to the plaintiff if the 
motion were granted.90 The Federal Rules require that this motion be made within 
one year of entry of the judgment,91 and the CPLR requires that it be made within 
one year after notice of the judgment was served.92
 Unlike the Federal Rules, the CPLR has a special provision for defendants who 
are served by a method other than personal delivery: Rule 317 states that if the court 
finds that the defendant did not receive actual notice, relief may be sought within 
one year of learning of the judgment, but not more than five years after its entry.93 
When this basis is relied on, the defendant need not assert any justification for the 
delay, but must still assert a meritorious defense.94
 When considering the possibility of obtaining a vacatur for “excusable delay,” 
there are time limits to consider. Under the Federal Rules, if the client fails to notice 
the default judgment for over a year after it is entered, she will be barred from 
asserting this defense. Under the CPLR, she could await notice of the judgment, but 
she would need to act within one year.95 In both jurisdictions, she would have to 
assert a meritorious defense to the underlying cause of action. However, even if she 
responds on time and offers a meritorious defense, she would still be at a judge’s 
mercy on the issue of whether her delay was justified, and so determining her 
likelihood of success would be difficult.
 The alternate grounds for relief under rule 317 of the CPLR seem inapplicable to 
the client’s situation. No court has addressed the issue of whether receipt of an e-mail, 
without opening the attached summons, would qualify as “actual notice” for the 
purposes of this rule. However, given the obvious analogy to receiving a letter but 
never opening the envelope, it seems unlikely—although certainly debatable—that 
she would succeed in maintaining that she did not receive “actual notice” of the action 
89. Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(1); C.P.L.R. 5015(a)(1); see 2 Ferstendig, supra note 76, § 24.05[b][1], at 24-24 
to -25.
90. See 2 Ferstendig, supra note 76, § 24.05[b][1], at 24-24 n.5.
91. Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(c)(1).
92. C.P.L.R. 5015(a)(1).
93. Id. at 317. This provision is distinct from, and imposes no limitation on, the various grounds for relief 
available under rule 5015 of the CPLR. See Ariowitsch v. Johnson, 498 N.Y.S.2d 891, 893 (App. Div. 
1986). Therefore, a defendant may assert lack of jurisdiction as a ground for relief at any time regardless 
of whether rule 317 would be available. Id.
94. Ariowitsch, 498 N.Y.S.2d at 893. However, this provision is unavailable in actions for divorce, annulment, 
or partition. C.P.L.R. 317. 
95. Under New York law, she will still be able to resort to the court’s discretionary authority to vacate 
judgment. See infra Part IV.E.
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simply because she did not open the e-mail.96 Therefore, there is an appreciable risk 
that she would not be given the ability to defend on the merits that rule 317 provides.
 E. Discretionary Relief
 Under rule 60(b)(6) of the Federal Rules, a federal court may grant relief from a 
judgment for “any other reason that justifies relief,”97 as long as it is requested within 
a “reasonable time” after entry.98 However, a defendant may not use this provision to 
circumvent the time limits of the other grounds for relief, since this provision is 
exclusive of those grounds.99 Therefore, where a defendant is asserting excusable 
default or fraud, this provision is unavailable.100
 New York courts have broader discretion, since they retain the inherent authority 
to vacate their own judgments at any time if doing so is in the interest of substantial 
justice.101 Unlike the Federal Rules, the New York courts’ discretion is in addition to 
their statutory authority; thus, defendants have a safety net if they must rely on 
grounds for which the statutory time period has elapsed or if they are unable to 
excuse a delay in seeking relief.102
 Therefore, in federal court, rule 60(b)(6) would be of little use to the client. Since 
the Federal Rules consider this authority to be exclusive of the other statutory 
grounds for relief, her only available argument under this provision is that relief 
would be justified simply because of the unusual form of notice.103 The likelihood of 
succeeding on this argument will vary depending, for example, on whether the 
details offered in the e-mail body supported an assumption of spam or legitimacy, 
the particular judge’s philosophy on e-service and the Internet generally, and how 
common e-service had become by the time she received the message. Again, this 
provides no clear solution for the client.
96. Cf. Bennett v. Patel Catskills, LLC, 990 N.Y.S.2d 594, 595 (App. Div. 2014) (determining that the fact 
that the summons sent via certified mail was returned as “unclaimed” raised a triable issue of fact as to 
whether the defendant received notice). The negative ramifications of allowing a recipient to succeed on 
this argument are palpable. One could easily negate an otherwise valid e-service attempt by simply 
refusing to open the e-mail. Nevertheless, valid reasons for nonreceipt of e-mail might include that the 
message was routed into a “ junk” mail folder or that it was sent to an outdated e-mail address. In those 
instances, a defendant might be able to prove that notice was never received, although obtaining 
evidence years later might be difficult.
97. Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6).
98. Id. at 60(c)(1).
99. Wesco Prods. Co. v. Alloy Auto. Co., 880 F.2d 981, 983 (7th Cir. 1989).
100. Id.
101. See Woodson v. Mendon Leasing Corp., 790 N.E.2d 1156, 1160 (N.Y. 2003); 1 Ferstendig, supra note 
76, § 24.05[a].
102. See Piatt v. Horsley, 970 N.Y.S.2d 155 (App. Div. 2013); McMahon v. City of New York, 483 N.Y.S.2d 
228 (App. Div. 1984).
103. Other available arguments, such as lack of jurisdiction, fraud, and excusable delay, would have to be 
considered under the other provisions of rule 60 of the Federal Rules, and thus be subject to the 
applicable time limits.
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 However, under New York law, the client would be able to seek relief from any 
judgment obtained, since New York courts retain inherent authority to do so. Even 
so, there is no guarantee that a court would agree to vacate the judgment, and so the 
best attorneys can do is predict the most likely outcome. Unfortunately, without 
opening the attachment to evaluate the underlying facts, the attorney would have no 
way to even speculate about the potential prejudice that might be in store for the 
plaintiff if the client ignores the e-mail. Thus, while the mere existence of this 
discretionary authority might provide some comfort for the client if she decides to 
ignore the e-mail altogether, it still fails to resolve the dilemma completely; there 
remains a risk that the judgment will not be vacated.
 F. Resulting Policy Implications
 Again, what would the “reasonably prudent person” do in this circumstance? 
Even if the client has maintained the same permanent residence for many years, 
there is a small possibility that the e-mail is legitimate and that the plaintiff has lied 
about attempting traditional methods of service, hoping to obtain a default judgment 
without her knowledge.104 Further, if the client has recently moved, the possibility 
that the e-mail is legitimate increases, especially if she did not provide a forwarding 
address to the post office.105 It would be helpful, especially in the latter case, to know 
more about the purported cause of action before deciding whether to open the 
attachment. For instance, she might be able to identify the plaintiff as someone she 
associated with prior to switching residences or find other useful information in the 
complaint. Unfortunately, without opening the attachment, there would be no way 
to conduct this investigation. In either scenario, there is no guarantee that the client 
would be able to vacate a resulting judgment, and, at the very least, attempting to do 
so would likely impose certain expenses that she would not otherwise incur, such as 
hiring an attorney.
 The situation is made worse by two additional factors. First, given the relative 
infrequency with which e-service is used, it is more likely for the message to be 
fraudulent than legitimate. However, a default judgment might be even more 
104. See Siegel, supra note 22, § 71, at 117; supra note 86 (discussing “sewer service,” where the process 
server swears to service having been completed when none was ever attempted). For example, a debt-
collector could have a legitimate cause of action against the client, but be reluctant to hire a reputable 
process server. See Service, Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014) (defining “sewer service” as “[t]he 
fraudulent service of process on a debtor by a creditor seeking to obtain a default judgment”); Default 
Judgments, Gutter Service and the Statute of Limitations, Hub Pages (Feb. 10, 2011), http://hubpages.
com/money/Default-Judgments-Gutter-Service-and-the-Statute-of-Limitations; see also Pandiscia v. 
Pandiscia, No. 321/2012, 9 N.Y.S.3d 594, 2014 WL 7530334, at *2 (Sup. Ct. Dec. 22, 2014) 
(unpublished table decision) (“‘[S]ewer service’ . . . occurs ‘when a process server discards court papers 
and claims they were duly served, recording a fictitious date and time of service in the log and in the 
court affidavits of service.’” (quoting First Commercial Bank of Memphis, N.A. v. Ndiaye, 733 N.Y.S.2d 
562, 564 (Sup. Ct. 2001))).
105. See Snyder v. Alternate Energy Inc., 857 N.Y.S.2d 442, 448–49 (Civ. Ct. 2008) (finding that the 
plaintiffs established impracticability of serving the defendant because, inter alia, they were not able to 
locate a forwarding address at the local post office).
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problematic than malware for the average recipient, especially if it cannot be vacated. 
Second, those recipients who are less technologically inclined, and thus less likely to 
have effective malware detection software, are more susceptible to such scams.
 Therefore, the existence of e-service alone creates both legal and practical 
obligations for e-mail users to open an attachment from an unknown source. While 
the chance that a given message is legitimate will vary depending on the recipient’s 
circumstances, there is no way for any individual to know for sure. This exposes 
individuals’ sensitive information, and can punish e-mail users for being cautious 
about their legal rights.
V. POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS
 From the above discussion, three points should be evident. First, there is no 
uniform way that e-service must be accomplished.106 While it would be possible for a 
court to require the body of the e-service message to include helpful information 
about the court and claims alleged, it is not currently required. As a result, a 
legitimate e-service message might contain no information explaining the attachment, 
and so the recipient of a generic e-service message cannot safely disregard it.
 Second, while e-mail and social media are ideal methods for reaching an elusive 
defendant who nevertheless maintains an online presence, those same platforms also 
serve as ideal mediums for fraud and identity theft.107 Further, as e-service becomes 
more widely accepted, recipients of e-service messages will be more likely to believe 
they are legitimate and open the potentially harmful attachments.
 Third, a recipient of a legitimate e-service message may be unable to vacate a 
resulting judgment, especially if the plaintiff was honest about her attempts to effect 
service by traditional means.108 Even if they are not barred from obtaining a vacatur, 
recipients pursuing this relief may face practical difficulties that become greater with 
time. For instance, to prove that one did not receive notice is to prove a negative, and 
it could be difficult to demonstrate that the efforts outlined by a plaintiff to initially 
justify e-service were not actually attempted.109
 Thus, in its current state, e-service creates a fertile environment for spam attacks 
purporting to contain service of process. If left unattended, this environment will 
only get worse as e-service becomes more routine.110 However, there are ways to 
mitigate the risks while leaving intact the availability of e-service to plaintiffs who 
are frustrated by an elusive defendant, although each of the possibilities suffers from 
its own set of limitations.
 One solution is to create a standard format for e-service messages to follow that 
would allow recipients to remotely verify that they are indeed named in a pending 
106. See supra text accompanying notes 34–51.
107. See supra Part III. 
108. See supra Part IV.E.
109. See supra Part IV.C–D.
110. See supra pp. 460–61.
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action, not just targets of a spam attack. This requirement would provide certainty to 
recipients, since they could safely disregard any message without the requisite 
information. Perhaps the simplest, and most effective, method would be to require 
all e-service messages to contain, in the message body or subject line, a document 
identifier that will allow the recipient to search for the court filings independently.111 
The most readily available identifier would be an index number, which would be 
given to plaintiffs when they file the complaint.112 By providing the index number, in 
addition to any other information required to search for the filings,113 all the recipient 
would have to do is look up the index number and read the corresponding documents. 
 One shortcoming of this approach, however, is that spammers might attempt to 
create their own fraudulent means of “verifying” the message. A spammer might 
compose a message that follows the same general format as a legitimate e-service 
message, and directs recipients to a fraudulent website.114 However, so long as a 
plaintiff is required to provide a specific type of document identifier, a recipient 
would, at the least, be able to confer with counsel before visiting the website and 
thereby be advised against doing so. This approach, of course, is of little help to 
those who are not computer savvy, or have no means of retaining counsel or verifying 
court documents.
 Another possibility is to have courts send the messages via a central server.115 At 
first glance, this would seem to reduce the threat of spam by allowing individuals to 
simply check the sender’s information to confirm legitimacy. However, there are 
several problems with this proposal. First, courts do not typically take responsibility 
for effecting service on behalf of a plaintiff.116 Second, this would require courts to 
devote their limited resources to creating an e-mail server and assigning personnel to 
compose and send such e-mails. Finally, spammers routinely “mask” their true e-mail 
111. Individuals can search for a case by entering their name into the search field and checking if they are 
named as defendants in a pending action. See WebCivil Supreme—Case Search, N.Y. St. Unified Ct. 
Sys., https://iapps.courts.state.ny.us/webcivil/FCASSearch (last visited Apr. 6, 2017). However, this 
still does not alert individuals to whether the e-mail is legitimate, and the task could be arduous for 
individuals with fairly common last names. Further, this option is unavailable for some local courts. See 
WebCivil Local—Available Courts, N.Y. St. Unified Ct. Sys., https://iapps.courts.state.ny.us/
webcivilLocal/LCAvailableCourts (last visited Apr. 6, 2017). Thus, providing court information and an 
index number, which would enable direct inquiry, is a better solution.
112. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. 306-a (McKinney 2017).
113. In New York, for example, one would also need the name of the court and county to conduct the 
necessary search by index number. See, e.g., WebCivil Supreme—Case Search, supra note 111.
114. See Henderson, supra note 53, at 369–70.
115. The Colorado court system accepts filings through an integrated court filing system; however, it 
specifically excludes personal service of process and applies only to service of pleadings and other 
documents subsequent to the originating documents upon parties who have already registered for the 
system. Colo. R. Civ. P. 5(b)(2)(D); ICCES User Agreement—Terms and Conditions of Use, Integrated 
Colo. Cts. E-Filing Sys. 6, https://www.courts.state.co.us/userfiles/file/terms.pdf (last updated May 
11, 2015).
116. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(c)(2) (“Any person who is at least 18 years old and not a party may serve a summons 
and complaint.”).
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address to make it appear that the message is coming from someone else.117 Thus, 
this solution might be counterproductive by providing a “mask” that spammers know 
will be effective.118
 Yet another solution is to allow e-service recipients to freely open judgments 
obtained against them if they (1) do so within a reasonable time after learning of the 
judgment, and (2) can establish ignorance of the underlying cause of action at the 
time of receipt. The first requirement could be modeled after rule 317 of the CPLR, 
which automatically allows defendants to open a judgment to defend on the merits if 
they move to do so within the time requirements. This would prevent a legal 
obligation to open an e-service attachment from being imposed on individuals who 
are not truly evading service—the vast majority of Internet users—provided they 
have no reason to suspect they are being sued. The second requirement would 
encourage plaintiffs to include detailed information in the body of an e-service 
message, thus facilitating a defendant’s inquiry into its legitimacy, since any 
information provided will operate against the defendant’s claim of ignorance.
 However, this option may create uncertainty for a plaintiff, since it threatens the 
finality of a judgment obtained by e-service. Further, it would do nothing to address 
the apparent legitimacy of fraudulent e-service messages, and would not provide a 
way to determine, with certainty, whether an e-service message is legitimate. Thus, 
for the unsuspecting recipient who does not seek the advice of counsel before opening 
an attachment, this solution will provide no benefit.119
 Finally, it may be helpful to establish uniformity among the circumstances for 
which e-service is allowed. For instance, jurisdictions could statutorily limit e-service 
to certain causes of action or require certain objective criteria to be met before 
e-service may be used.120 Similar to the solution of requiring document identifiers to 
be placed in e-service messages, this would allow a recipient to independently 
determine whether there could be any legal consequences from not opening the 
attachment. However, unlike an index number, this would not allow an individual to 
guarantee, before opening the attachment, that an e-service message is legitimate; it 
only provides them with the enhanced ability to calculate the probability that they 
will face legal consequences if it actually is. Also, there is always the chance that an 
117. See Henderson, supra note 53, at 370.
118. The same argument can be used against requiring a standard template for e-service messages that does 
not include an independently verifiable document identifier. For example, the court in Snyder v. 
Alternate Energy Inc. directed the e-service message to bear the subject line, “LEGAL PAPERS OPEN 
ATTACHMENT IMMEDIATELY.” 857 N.Y.S.2d 442, 444 (Civ. Ct. 2008).
119. In contrast, if an e-mail contains an index number, recipients could consult the court’s website to 
determine authenticity, which will spare them the expense of consulting an attorney.
120. For example, jurisdictions might limit e-service to defendants who are actively evading service or who 
moved without leaving a forwarding address. To challenge jurisdiction after the fact, defendants could 
simply offer evidence that they were not actively evading service or that they did leave a forwarding 
address with a post office.
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individual recipient might meet the statutory criteria, but nevertheless open what 
turns out to be a fraudulent attachment.121
 Overall, any solution, even a limited one, would be better established by statute 
than by case law. If courts continue to have unbridled discretion to allow e-service, 
limited only by “due process,” there exists a possibility that a given judge will allow 
e-service for different criteria than those routinely required by other judges. Further, 
to establish binding precedent, it will be necessary for some individuals to bear the 
expense of appeal to establish a standard for others. If not addressed by statute, until 
a willing litigant steps forward, e-mail users everywhere will continue to be faced 
with a dilemma when confronted with an apparent e-service message.
VI. CONCLUSION
 While e-service is beneficial for those plaintiffs seeking to serve an elusive 
defendant, it also enhances the apparent legitimacy of spam attacks that purport to 
contain e-service. These attacks pose a unique risk to recipients because, under 
current practice, e-service messages do nothing to distinguish themselves from spam. 
Also, because the authority to allow e-service is largely discretionary, there are few 
uniform rules to help someone determine, in advance of opening an attachment, 
whether the e-mail is legitimate, and, if so, what the legal ramifications of ignoring 
the message would be.
 Among the solutions available, the simplest and most effective is to require all 
e-service messages to provide an index number and jurisdictional information within 
the body of the e-mail. This would allow recipients to conduct their own search to 
confirm whether the e-mail is legitimate before they open any attachment. Another 
useful solution would be to allow defendants to freely open a judgment obtained by 
e-service as long as they do so within a certain amount of time after receiving notice 
of the judgment and can establish ignorance of the underlying cause of action. This 
will encourage plaintiffs to provide enough information in the body of an e-mail to 
demonstrate to the recipient that the message is legitimate.
 Fortunately, these options are not mutually exclusive. Though they are imperfect, 
implementing them will enhance the benefits of e-service, and reduce the risks.
121. Since spammers routinely send e-mails to thousands of recipients, there is always a chance that at least 
one recipient could satisfy the statutory criteria. See Henderson, supra note 53, at 370; How Spam 
Works, supra note 68.
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